We are given a bipartite graph $G = \left( A \cup B, E \right)$. In the one-sided model, every $a \in A$ (often called agents) ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and no $b \in B$ has any preference order over its neighbours $y \in N_{b}$, and vertices in $B$ abstain from casting their votes to matchings. In the two-sided model with one-sided ties, every $a \in A$ ranks its neighbours $z \in N_{a}$ strictly, and every $b \in B$ puts all of its neighbours into a single large tie, i.e., $b \in B$ prefers every $y \in N_{b}$ equally. In this two-sided model with one-sided ties, when two matchings compete in a majority election, $b \in B$ abstains from casting its vote for a matching when both the matchings saturate $b$ or both leave $b$ unsaturated; else $b$ prefers the matching where it is saturated. A popular matching $M$ is \emph{robust} if it remains popular among multiple instances. We have analysed the cases when a robust popular matching exists in the one-sided model where only one agent alters her preference order among the instances, and we have proposed a polynomial-time algorithm to decide if there exists a robust popular matching when instances differ only with respect to the preference orders of a single agent. We give a simple characterisation of popular matchings in the two-sided model with one-sided ties. We show that in the two-sided model with one-sided ties, if the input instances differ only with respect to the preference orders of a single agent, there is a polynomial-time algorithm to decide whether there exists a robust popular matching. We have been able to decide the stable matching problem in bipartite graphs $G = (A \cup B, E)$ where \textit{both} sides have weak preferences (ties allowed), with the restriction that every tie has length at most $k$.

We consider stable and popular matching problems in arbitrary graphs, which are referred to as stable roommates instances. We extend the 3/2-approximation algorithm for the maximum size weakly stable matching problem to the roommates case, which solves a more than 20 year old open question of Irving and Manlove about the approximability of maximum size weakly stable matchings in roommates instances with ties [Irving and Manlove 2002] and has nice applications for the problem of matching residents to hospitals in the presence of couples. We also extend the algorithm that finds a maximum size popular matching in bipartite graphs in the case of strict preferences and the algorithm to find a popular matching among maximum weight matchings. While previous attempts to extend the idea of promoting the agents or duplicating the edges from bipartite instances to arbitrary ones failed, these results show that with the help of a simple observation, we can indeed bridge the gap and extend these algorithms

An important aspect of multi-agent systems concerns the formation of coalitions that are stable or optimal in some well-defined way. The notion of popularity has recently received a lot of attention in this context. A partition is popular if there is no other partition in which more agents are better off than worse off. In this paper, we study popularity, strong popularity, and mixed popularity (which is particularly attractive because existence is guaranteed by the Minimax Theorem) in a variety of coalition formation settings. Extending previous work on marriage games, we show that mixed popular partitions in roommate games can be found efficiently via linear programming and a separation oracle. This approach is quite universal, leading to efficient algorithms for verifying whether a given partition is popular and for finding strongly popular partitions (resolving an open problem). By contrast, we prove that both problems become computationally intractable when moving from coalitions of size 2 to coalitions of size 3, even when preferences are strict and globally ranked. Moreover, we show that finding popular, strongly popular, and mixed popular partitions in symmetric additively separable hedonic games and symmetric fractional hedonic games is NP-hard. Together, these results indicate strong boundaries to the tractability of popularity in both ordinal and cardinal models of hedonic games.

We propose a constraint programming approach to the popular matching problem. We show that one can use the Global Cardinality Constraint to encode the problem even in cases that involve ties in the ordinal preferences of the applicants.

Different formulations are proposed, distinguishing The notion of popular matching was introduced by (Gardenfors between one-sided matching (Garg et al. 2010) and twosided 1975), but this notion has its roots in the 18th century matching, e.g. the stable marriage (SM) problem (Gale and the notion of a Condorcet winner.